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British Labour and the European Union:  The 
Europeanisation of Trade Unions? 
 
Introduction 
The revitalisation of the EU since the 1980s has seen a qualitative change in the 
trajectory of the integration project.  Market integration is at the core of the 
change and represents Europe’s response to competitive challenges from US 
and Japanese markets.  The Single European Act and the subsequent rounds of 
intergovernmental conferences [IGCs, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice etc] have 
deepened market integration by removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to the 
free-movement of goods and services.  This has been achieved by relaxing the 
intergovernmental decision-making process and allowing for qualified majority 
voting [QMV] in the Council of Ministers in policy areas concerned with market 
making.  The consolidation of the single market has been followed by the 
creation of a single European currency.  Although the UK has yet to decide 
whether or not to participate in Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], these 
changes are significant for trade unions.  Previously nationally bounded firms 
have now become Euro-companies with corporate governance, in addition to 
macro-economic, financial and political governance, shifting to the European 
level. 
For trade unions, the neo-liberal core of the European integration project has 
important implications for the achievement of their aims and objectives.  Member 
states of the EU can no longer pursue independent national strategies of macro-
economic management and therefore trade union political achievements, linked 
as they are to the nation-state, are threatened by erosion.   
The Maastricht Social Agreement [MSA], although limited, has provided a 
potential mechanism at the Euro-level for trade union participation in EU 
decision-making.  The EU has delivered some important new social and labour 
market Directives.  In addition the European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC] 
has made some important changes to its structure that are significant given the 
limited and contested nature of the incentives deriving from European integration 
[Dølvik 1997].  Interpretations of these developments are highly contested 
between optimistic and pessimistic views on the EU as an arena to deliver more 
than market integration.  The assessments of the threats and opportunities of 
European integration for trade unions are complex and their responses to these 
processes are contingent on factors not solely associated with the European 
level. 
This paper argues that the perceived costs, benefits and opportunities of deeper 
European integration will vary across trade union organisations due to sectoral 
orientation.  In addition, a positive assessment of ‘Europe’ and further integration 
does not necessarily result in Europeanisation of any kind.  A particular trade 
union’s response to the EU is also subject to internal ideological and 
organisational constraints [Marks & McAdam 1996].  By analysing responses of   2
trade union organisations to instances of EU integration this study hopes to 
highlight 
•  How union organisations assess deepening European integration and the 
developing European political economy. 
•  The role of industrial location or sectoral orientation in the assessment of 
perceived economic and political interests. 
•  The role of internal organisational dynamics/constraints in determining the 
direction and extent of responses. 
The following section overviews the most important literature relating to trade 
union organisation/ideology and the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of 
developing governance structures and political economy at EU level. 
Trade Union Case Study: Level of Analysis and Concept. 
This paper explores individual trade union organisations [T&G, GMB] rather than 
European level [ETUC] or National level federations [TUC], although quite clearly 
the approach of both the ETUC and TUC influence, not determine, the positions 
and strategies of the affiliates.  The paper deals mainly with trade union 
positions, defined as the official policy positions of a trade union together with the 
attitudes of its leaders and key personnel, for instance the senior European or 
research officers.  The role of the rank and file, unless significant, in the 
formation of a union’s policy will be outside the scope of this study. 
In addition the paper briefly outlines the engagement by the union with EU 
issues.  By examining the different avenues pursued by trade unions in 
attempting [or not] to influence decision-making in the EU helps shed light on the 
extent of Europeanisation.  Teague [1989] suggests that even if the TUC were to 
move away from its negative anti-Europe position of the 1980s, its lack of 
strategic analyses on the opportunity structure of the EC meant that in strategic 
terms there were no differences between the pro, anti or pragmatic trade union 
responses ‘none attached any importance to industrial or economic initiatives at 
the European level’ [ibid. p.42]. 
If a meaningful Europeanisation thesis is to be argued then trade unions must be 
doing something in addition to changing their policy positions.  Trade unions are 
after all ‘agencies for action’ [Offe & Wiesenthal 1985].  In addition by tracking 
how trade unions represent interests in the EU polity the particular union’s 
conceptualisation of the EU becomes clearer.  Simplistically if trade unions focus 
their interest representation on National government ministers and/or institutions 
then this suggests that they view the nation state as the most influential and/or 
legitimate actor in the EU, an inter-governmentalist interpretation of the polity. 
This brings us to the question of what do trade unions do.  In Britain the focus of 
trade union activity has been industrial and specifically workplace orientated; this 
fits with the narrow theory of labour organisations from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’   3
school.
1.  The trade union movement in Britain established the TUC and 
subsequently the Labour Party as the vehicles to represent the political interests 
of the working class; a clear divide between industrial and political spheres.  
Although both sides of the labour movement jealously guard their respective 
spheres from the other [Minkin 1991] developments in the twentieth century 
clearly illustrate that such a distinction, in the British case at least, is untenable.  
Initially, it is true, trade unions generally only ventured into politics to secure their 
immunities from the law [Hyman 2001, Pelling 1963].  However, post World War 
II until the late 1970s saw the trade union movement drawn into the affairs of 
State, in a very peculiarly British way, culminating in the Social Contracts of the 
1970s.  Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon pre-occupation with collective bargaining 
and voluntarism was tempered by attempts to negotiate a social wage, a form of 
unionism referred to as ‘Labourism’ [Saville 1973 in Hyman 2001]. 
This paper adopts the conceptual approach to trade unions taken by Marks & 
McAdam [1996] and Dølvik [1997].  EU governance represents something very 
different from previous national developments and so it is highly unlikely that 
trade union Europeanisation is going to follow national norms, in Britain based on 
voluntarism and the ‘free collective bargaining’ fundamental.  Trade unions are 
one of a number of ‘challenging groups’ seeking to influence the emerging 
European polity and so national distinctions between pressure groups, social 
movements and trade unions are irrelevant in this context. 
Given the lack of collective bargaining at the EU level it seems reasonable to 
concentrate on the political sphere of union activity.  In addition the two trade 
unions [GMB & T&G] that form this case study represent membership 
constituencies in a number of different industrial sectors; a comprehensive 
analysis of each industrial sector within each union is well beyond the scope of a 
single-researcher project. 
 
Europeanisation 
Relating this study to the definitions of Europeanisation set out in the paper by 
Bache & Jordan [2004] it reveals that trade union organisations could be 
approached using a number of the five definitions, with imagination? 
For instance, using the ‘top-down’ approach; measuring the impact of EU 
initiatives on domestic trade union discourse, structure and policy.  A theme ripe 
for study under this definition might well be the current vogue for the ‘social 
partnership’ approach to industrial relations among some TUC affiliates.  In a 
study of this kind, given that the establishment of an EU industrial relations 
regime is in its infancy
2, the analysis of the ‘horizontal transfer of concepts and 
policies in the EU between member states’ [definition 4, ibid] could be included to 
determine which member states’ model [if any] is being cross-loaded.  Trade 
                                                 
1 Perlman [1926] theorised that a ‘mature’ trade union is one that deals specifically with its members 
interests in the workplace/industrial sector, political action is deemed a perversion of trade unionism. 
2 Although clearly its design to date is in line with ‘social partnership’ ideology.   4
unions interact with their European counterparts in the ETUC via the TUC and 
the European Industry Federations [EIFs] and the sub-committee structure.  Also 
in the modern technological age unions have the capability to link up more easily 
with sister European organisations independently on a bi-lateral basis 
However, establishing causality is a major issue for studies of this type.  
Identifying changing practices that are similar or identical to EU or other member 
states is one thing being precise and conclusive about where they originated is 
another.  One example clearly illustrating this point is the use of the term 
Europeanisation to describe the Conservative Government’s legislation on 
industrial relations.  Legislation replacing voluntarism and legal immunities does 
appear to bring British industrial relations more in line with Continental models 
but to term this process as Europeanisation is misleading because quite clearly 
the design and impact of this legislation was to shift the British model away from 
European norms of social partnership toward American norms of share-holder 
value [MacShane 1991]. 
Another potential problem faced by the researcher when using this definition of 
Europeanisation is that particular practices are identified as being potentially 
Europeanisation [and then examined] with the potential to overlook other factors 
contradicting a process of Europeanisation.  For instance, together with ‘social 
partnership’ another response of the British trade unions to their domestic ‘crisis’ 
has been the ‘organising’ theme.  Focusing on recruiting members and 
organising the grass roots rather than seeking partnership deals with employers.  
Inspiration for this approach comes from Australia and the United States and it 
reinforces the traditional oppositional ideology of British trade unionism ‘bounced’ 
back from other Anglo-Saxon models.  How do we then conclude if British trade 
unions are Europeanising or not?  Compare the extent to which both themes are 
manifest?  Given that the TUC has established an organising academy are we to 
term this the Australianisation of trade unionism? 
Another possible relevant definition of Europeanisation could be to track efforts of 
British trade unions to pre-empt any kind of domestic adaptation to EU initiatives 
by ‘uploading’ its national model of industrial relations to the EU level.  However, 
the domestic crisis of the British industrial relations surely rules out attempts to 
‘upload’ voluntarism in order to forgo legislative initiatives for increased worker 
rights?  A study of the German or Swedish trade unions might however be a 
good case study for this definition
3. 
These definitions although potentially viable; in this case are more spurious than 
the final two outlined below.  The remaining two definitions are therefore the most 
pertinent for this paper. 
Cowles et al. [2001] utilise a definition of Europeanisation that is identical to 
European integration and then explore the response to ‘the accumulation of 
policy competences at the EU level’ by domestic actors.  This paper looks 
                                                 
3 The T&G do however want to ‘upload’ British policy on macro-economic management to reform EMU 
and the ECB.   5
specifically at trade union responses to integration in general and EMU 
specifically both involve the accumulation of competences at the EU level. 
Although the establishment of an EU industrial relations regime is incomplete the 
rough contours of a social partnership model from the level of the firm to EU level 
is beginning to take shape.  Exploring trade union positions on EMU illustrate the 
extent to which trade unions view the EU as a legitimising reference point when 
justifying their policy positions.  If the EU ‘is akin to a lodestar that is difficult if not 
impossible to ignore’ then this should be apparent in their policy positions and the 
extent of their engagement with the EU polity. 
By analysing responses of trade union organisations to instances of EU 
integration this study links empirical research directly to EU initiatives, thereby 
removing the obstacle of establishing causality highlighted above.  Four possible 
trade union responses are conceivable; ideological opposition [not 
Europeanisation], inertia [not Europeanisation], coercive Europeanisation [not 
ideologically opposed but opposition based on the specifics] and voluntary 
Europeanisation [support].  In addition voluntary and coercive Europeanisation 
can refer to the Direct or Indirect impact of an EU initiative.  This paper is 
concerned with ‘the accumulation of policy competences at the EU level’ and the 
response of trade unions.  Therefore, Direct Europeanisation refers to changes at 
the EU level and Indirect Europeanisation to the inadvertent knock on effects at 
the domestic level and other policy areas.  Taking EMU as an example, a 
particular trade union might support the idea of European economic and 
monetary union but oppose EMU based on the specific EU rules governing the 
macro-economy [intentional] and the perceived impact domestically in other 
sectors, for instance public services [inadvertent since EMU does not specifically 
set out to cut public spending]. In such a case the response is coercive 
Europeanisation [both Direct and Indirect]
4. 
 
European Integration, Trade Unionism and Europeanisation. 
Existing approaches to the study of trade unions have been historically contingent 
on the evolution of national industrial relations rooted in the implicit assumption of 
congruence between regulatory systems of employment and the nation-state” 
[Dølvik 1997, p.14] 
As a starting point Visser [1997] highlights to the interplay between ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors that encourage trade unions to Europeanise.  This chimes well with 
the well-worn debate in European integration studies between the neo-
functionalists and inter-governmentalists.  For the neo-functionalists, the 
emphasis is the ‘pull’ of the European level [Haas 1958].  Inter-governmentalists 
posit that integration generally occurs only when the domestic context can no 
longer deliver what it once could [Moravscik 1993]. 
                                                 
4 See Figure 2.   6
Unions may be pushed or forced to seek co-operation across national borders 
because they no longer find allies, protection or rewards within national arenas.  
This may be true for labour and capital, and may be unrelated to European 
integration.  [Visser 1997, p.231] 
Sequentially the push comes before the pull.  The internationalisation of markets 
and capital means national industrial relations regimes are no longer able to 
deliver what they once did for the trade union movement and this forces them to 
look further a field for solutions.  Implicit here is that the push dynamics will vary 
according to the sectoral orientation of the particular trade union.  A distinction 
can be made between exposed and sheltered sectors of the labour market 
[Bieler 2003]. 
Unions operating in production sectors that are trans-nationally organised and 
nationally organised but produce goods for international markets are more 
likely to be supportive of European integration given their exposure to 
globalisation.  They are likely to be more supportive of economic [negative] 
integration and the neo-liberal restructuring this entails due to exposure to 
international competition.  Labour market regulation and political [positive] 
integration at the EU level are to be supported as a means to claw back political 
control over the market as it expands from national to European proportions 
without running the risk of regime competition and social dumping. 
Unions with members located in sectors domestically organised predominantly 
producing goods for national consumption are likely to oppose further European 
integration [especially economic] ‘since it undermines national policy autonomy, 
on the support of which they depend’ [Bieler 2003: p.29]
5. 
Both the T&G and the GMB represent membership constituencies across both 
the exposed and sheltered sectors of the labour market.  The T&G has a slightly 
larger proportion of its members in the exposed sector of the labour market than 
the GMB.  This is not to say that sectoral orientation is less salient in General 
Unions, it simply indicates that the perceived cost and benefit analysis of support 
or opposition to further integration becomes much more complicated for union 
organisations. 
Recent developments at the EU level make it the obvious target [pull] for trade 
unions simply because other international organisations [ILO, IMF, World Bank 
etc] do not provide any opportunity presently for directly regulating the 
employment relationship and wider issues in social policy. 
In industrial relations literature the functional logic of trade union organisation 
matching the boundaries of the market stretches right back to the turn of the 
century.  The seminal work of Commons [1909] examined the expansion of local 
markets to the national level in the USA; his basic argument was that in order to 
“take wages out of competition” trade unions must extend their organisational 
                                                 
5 Findings have been mixed on the strength of this hypothesis.  Bieler[2003] found that in Britain the 
hypothesis held [UNISON anti-EMU and the AEEU pro-EMU].  Foster & Scott [2003] found that public 
sector unions across a number of EU member states have been predominantly supportive of EMU!   7
[bargaining] coverage from the local to the national level.  Given that the single 
market process implies an internationalisation of capital by the removal of trade 
barriers [negative integration] within a European context the extension of 
functional logic suggests that this is accompanied by trade union efforts to 
Europeanise their organisation, bargaining strategies and labour market 
regulation more generally [positive integration]
6. 
The optimistic perspective of functionalist thinking has been questioned by a 
more pessimistic stream of thought encouraged by the conspicuous lack of 
collective bargaining and/or a comprehensive social dimension at the European 
level. 
Ever since Commons, [1909] it has been a familiar argument that the boundaries 
of employment regulation are shaped by the scope of product markets; but there is 
nothing automatic in this process.  [Hyman 2001b: p281]. 
The Euro-pessimistic view criticises the assumed link between market expansion 
and positive integration.  The pessimists’ view does not contest that for trade 
unionism, in general, the rational course of action in response to market 
expansion is to ‘redraw the boundaries of solidarity’ [Dølvik 1997] but they 
emphasise that the obstacles faced at Euro-level preclude this course of action 
and thereby drive trade unions into cross-national competition [Streeck 1995, 
1999]. 
Specifically the obstacles to positive integration at the EU level are, the neo-
liberal core of the EU political economy, the lack of a central European 
government [political resources] to promote and sustain industrial relations 
institutions, the inability and/or unwillingness of employers to engage at 
European level and the specific problems of collective action faced by the ETUC. 
Recent Treaty changes from the mid 1980s onwards have significantly shifted 
the character of the EU in a neo-liberal direction [Geyer 1997, Scharpf 1996, 
Streeck & Schmitter 1991].  This supra-nationalisation of market making has not 
been accompanied by a comparable shift in social policy competence to the EU.  
The scope of the Maastricht Social Agreement [MSA] is limited to a small number 
of specified areas excluding some crucial elements seen within national systems 
of industrial relations
7.  The MSA does not balance the asymmetry between EU 
social/political and economic governance and signals the defeat of the aspiration 
for an effective pan European Social Dimension by reinforcing the principle of 
Subsidiarity in EU decision-making.  This has shifted previous EU aspirations for 
convergent social standards toward the principal of mutual recognition, leaving 
                                                 
6 Haas [1958] also predicted that trade unions would extend their organisational and bargaining strategies to 
the Euro-level – he claimed that his would then ‘compel an increasing measure of supranational unity 
among employers’ [p.388] 
7 For instance Article 2.6. states, “The provisions…shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right 
to strike or the right to impose lock outs.”  These constitute basic trade union rights underpinning trade 
union activity but remain the prerogative of national systems of regulation, thereby compounding European 
diversity between trade union movements.   8
effective power with the member-states.  Social democracy at the Euro-level is 
therefore overshadowed by neo-liberalism. 
While Streeck [1995] recognises that markets do indeed need governance, he 
differentiates between Community social policy and European social policy.  
Community policy is sufficient to make the market work and is not the same nor 
will it evolve into a European social policy capable of redistributing in ways seen 
previously in national systems.  Streeck emphasises the lack of political 
resources at the European level able to limit market forces ‘that pulverize social 
commitments and obligations unless placed under political control’ [Streeck 
1995: p. 409].  Without the support, or existence, of EU political resources 
providing incentives for Euro-level institutions they are unlikely to develop under 
a ‘voluntarist’ regime. 
Streeck [1995] also highlights the role of the other ‘player’ in Euro industrial 
relations, the reluctance [or ability] of the employers’ organisations to engage in 
any constructive dialogue at the Euro-level, let alone collective bargaining, unless 
they have an opportunity to dilute forthcoming legislative initiatives. 
The success of the ETUC, emerging as a single umbrella organisation 
representing the majority of trade unionists from across Europe is also a potential 
weakness.  The ‘conundrum of cross-national diversity’ [Ebbinghaus & Visser 
1994, p.4] and the difficulties faced by labour movements in divorcing themselves 
from their respective national, ideological and/or confessional orientation [Geyer 
1997, Dølvik 1997].  The ETUC as a vehicle for integration and coordination of 
trade unions is constrained by the diversity of its affiliates. 
The responses of trade unions to this ‘peculiar form’ of integration [EU] are 
regime competition and competitive solidarity based on short-term domestic 
survival, not European coordination or integration [Streeck 1995, 1999]. 
The decisive impact of intergovernmentalism and the neo-liberal European political 
economy has structurally precluded development of an effective supranational 
regime of social regulation and prevented any significant Europeanisation of trade 
unions. [Dølvik 1997: p.17] 
This pessimistic line of thinking has in turn been criticised by approaches that 
view integration as an on-going process where predictions of the ‘end-state’ of 
the integration process can not be made based solely on current structure.  
Historic institutionalist and multi-level governance approaches concede that 
nation states are important actors, especially with regard to Treaty changes.  
However, they add that once competences have been shifted to the EU level 
path dependencies, political agency and unintended outcomes dilute the 
importance of nation-state actors and create unforeseen possibilities for political 
agency for a number of non-nation-state actors [Pierson 1996]. 
Drawing on the above, unions are therefore more likely to engage in 
Europeanisation to secure policy objectives if the following two [material] 
conditions are met.   9
•  The ‘push’ factors emanating from the domestic level are sufficiently 
strong to cause unions to re-assess their historic reliance on national 
structures of governance.  This suggests a sectoral divide on questions of 
further integration, especially economic [EMU]. 
•  Unions assess the emerging EU governance structure and political 
economy optimistically.  An optimistic interpretation provides incentives for 
Europeanisation ‘pulling’ trade unions into engaging with the EU polity. 
Until this point it has been assumed that trade unions are able to slavishly pursue 
viable and rational responses based solely on perceived economic interests.  
The ‘logic of influence’ argument [Marks & McAdam 1996, Dølvik 1997].  Trade 
unions are also political communities.  Responses of trade unions are not solely 
determined by exogenous changes to economic, political and institutional 
structures that are subject to divergent interpretations.  Trade unions are ‘social 
institutions in their own right, and develop their own internal patterns of power, 
goal-seeking and conflict’ [Crouch 1982, p. 161]. 
It seems to us that these external agents of change have done little more than 
present union leaders and their allies with additional problems to solve.  Such 
change agents usually allow union leaders a variety of alternative responses, 
including, on some occasions, the alternative of inaction.  [Undy et. al 1981: p.23] 
Strategic choice is possible and responses are the outcome of ‘internal 
discussion, debate and often conflict”’ [Hyman 2001: p.170].  The internal 
dynamics/constraints of the organisation do provide another potential variable 
influencing trade union policy responses.  Responses to European integration 
can also depend on intra-union institutional and ideological struggles. 
With regard to the perceived EU opportunities, Marks and McAdam [1996] qualify 
the assumption that changes in the location of institutionalised power will 
inevitably lead to a shift in the location of mass politics in the following way.  The 
ability of trade unionism to interact with the EU political environment is 
more a function of its internal characteristics.  Of particular relevance here is the 
way inherited institutions and ideologies may constrain a group’s ability to exploit 
whatever EU-level opportunities are available.  That the link between political 
opportunity and movement response is not at all reflexive [Marks & McAdam 1996: 
p.103 – emphasis added] 
Although the focus of Marks & McAdam [1996] was the internal characteristics of 
the ETUC, the analytical framework is applicable to union organisation at the 
national and sub-national level.  Trade unions at the lower levels must also 
combine the two logics implied by this analytical perspective.  The extent and 
direction of Europeanisation is assumed to be dependent on the ‘logic of 
influence’ [perceived EU opportunities] and the ‘logic of membership’ [internal 
organisational constraints]; trade unions are after all democratic organisations 
that have to reconcile both effectiveness and legitimacy [Traxler & Schmitter 
1994 & Dølvik 1997]. If leaderships are not perceived by members to be   10
legitimate then members’ participation in action, their willingness to act, will be 
jeopardised [Offe & Wiesenthal, 1985], undermining the role of unions as 
agencies for action [Ibid.].
8 
Whether or not Europeanisation results from the confluence of these competing 
logics of ‘influence’ and ‘membership’ is subject to empirical investigation and 
can’t be decided a priori.  The extent to which external environment and internal 
organisational constraints influence trade union Europeanisation can not be 
determined by a simple analysis of EU governance or political economy and/or 
internal organisational constraints.  However, two key hypotheses can be drawn 
from the literature 
1.  Trade unions representing members in the exposed sector of the labour 
market will be more supportive of European integration. 
2.  Trade union organisations with high internal constraints are less likely to 
engage with the EU, regardless of whether Europeanisation represents a 
viable and rational response. [see Figure 1] 
                                                 
8 Trade unions in Britain comprise Craft, Industrial, General, White Collar, Public Sector types, all with 
different ideologies and identities and internal methods of balancing effectiveness and accountability – 
simplistically broken down into the tension between participatory vs. representative organisations.    11
The British Trade Union Movement.  
TUC enthusiasm for European integration is not shared by all its affiliates.  
Teague [1989] identifies three ideological groups or factions with regard to 
Europe among the TUC affiliates: the pro-Europeans, the anti-Europeans and the 
Pragmatists.  Rosamond [1993] updates these categories as he argues the 
question of membership is no longer up for debate but that the debate now 
concerns the type of Europe rather than membership of the EU.  Rosamond 
describes the various factions as the pro-commission group, the sectoral 
pragmatists and the left sceptics.  A more recent study claims that the changing 
external environment has indeed Europeanised the TUC leaving the anti-EU 
camp marginalised [Strange 2002]  However, divisions do remain, although the 
components of each faction may have shifted, and can be illustrated by the 
following three policy statements with regard to EMU. 
Joining the single currency early in the next parliament when the British economic 
cycle and that of the members of Euro-land are closer together offers us many 
advantages…Opting out is not a low risk policy for Britain.  It is a dangerous game 
to play with all our futures.
9 
UNISON reaffirms its policy of opposition to the single currency based on the 
Maastricht convergence criteria and the Amsterdam Stability Pact.
10 
Orchestrating a push for a referendum at this moment is premature as it cannot 
possibly be responsibly delivered within the lifetime of this Parliament, or indeed 
could Britain become a member of the single currency in this Parliament, so why 
behave like euro lemmings eager to leap off the euro cliff irrespective of the 
economic consequences?
11 
In order to more accurately categorise the ‘perceived opportunities’ of the two 
unions in this study the paper will refer to Dyson’s [2002 – cited in and adapted 
by Foster & Scott 2004: 708] EMU discourse themes. The interpretations 
underlying oppositional and supportive positions on EMU are more nuanced than 
debates on European integration previously and therefore require more effective 
categorisations [pro, anti do not suffice].  The four discourses on EMU Dyson 
identified are 
1.  EMU as an agent for globalising neo-liberalism. 
2.  EMU as dissolution of national identity and sovereignty. 
3.  EMU as preserving European model against Americanisation. 
4.  EMU as harmonising European model with globalisation. [cited in Foster & 
Scott 2004: 708] 
                                                 
9 A joint report, AEEU, GMB, GPMU, ISTC & KFAT, ‘A Trade Union Agenda For Europe’ 
http://www.gmb.org.uk/press_office/display.asp?id=73 
10 UNISON National Delegate Conference 2001. http://www.unison.org.uk/about/policieslist.asp 
11 Bill Morris [leader TGWU] New Year message to members – Monday 30
th December 2001 – Press 
Release, TGWU, PR02/001.   12
 
GMB Overview.  
The GMB is a general union and has over 700 000 members from a number of 
different sectors in both the exposed and sheltered parts of the economy
12.  The 
union has an unusual regional structure
13, with each of the 10 regions 
guaranteed places on the Central Executive Council [CEC] dependent on their 
respective membership levels.  The National Office [General Secretary] has 
jurisdiction over international policy and given the regional structure this insulates 
the leadership from the membership on EU issues.  Since 1988, it has been 
solidly located in the pro-Europe camp in the Labour movement.  The leader of 
the GMB has been instrumental not only in shaping GMB policy toward the EU 
but also in the conversion of the TUC.  The GMB has traditionally sat on the 
centre-right of the Labour movement. 
John Edmonds was the General Secretary of the GMB until 2003. First elected in 
1986, he was re-elected in 1991 and 1996. A member of the TUC General 
Council and its Executive Committee, he was President of the TUC in 1998. He 
is regarded as a leading strategist of the trade union movement and as such, he 
chaired the TUC Committee on European matters.  The GMB was the first union 
in Britain to open an office in Brussels, two years before the TUC opened their 
office.  Edmonds helped to launch Trade Unionists for Europe [Tufe] to campaign 
for early entry into the Euro and for a strong social dimension to the EU.  The 
GMB were not so keen on participation in Britain in Europe because of the focus 
on EMU, representing business interests, rather than a more balanced approach 
to Europe that also stresses the importance of developing the social dimension. 
Edmonds is often painted as an extreme Europeanist [Guardian 2003], however, 
one that voted against British membership of the EEC in the 1970s.  The 
engaging approach of the GMB to the EU originated in domestic crisis and is 
based on the acceptance that the integration project is here to stay 
1986 was a bleak time to become a union leader and Edmonds is quick to point 
out the instrumental role of Thatcher’s ‘unrelenting hostility’ in making the EU an 
attractive alternative. The closed doors of Whitehall contrasted to the open doors 
of Brussels ‘where arguments were taken on their merit’.  The possibility of 
bypassing Thatcher, opening up a new flank of attack, to enhance workers’ rights 
and protection seemed too good to be true.  Operating in a coercive domestic 
environment, both the UK government [Labour & Conservative] together with the 
CBI have resisted efforts to build a comprehensive social dimension at EU level.  
For the GMB the EU without the social dimension is both untenable and a 
concept harder to sell to British workers and the public more generally. 
                                                 
12 The Sections are Clothing & textiles, commercial services, construction & furniture, Timber & Allied, 
Energy & Utility, Engineering, Food & Leisure, Process, Public Services 
13 The Regions are Birmingham & W. Midlands, Liverpool/N. Wales/Irish, Lancashire, London, Midland 
& E. Coast, Northern, Scotland, Southern, South-Western, Yorkshire & N. Derbyshire.   13
Frankly, it does not help us when we are trying to build a positive case for Europe 
if the TUC has to keep taking the British Government to the European Court of 
Justice to win back employment rights which are clearly enshrined in Directives 
and which are freely accepted elsewhere in Europe. I would like to see a Labour 
Government in Britain leading the debate on social improvement, not being the last 
in a very long convoy expressing arrogant disapproval. [John Edmonds Speech to 
TUC – 12
th Sept. 2000] 
GMB ideology shifted from legal immunities and voluntarism, the drawbacks of 
which were all too apparent to trade unionists in the 1980s.  The European social 
model containing the basic elements of welfare state, positive worker rights and 
industrial democracy contrasted with the neo-liberal Thatcher government.  In the 
case of the GMB; the Thatcher government’s ‘push’ together with the aspiration 
to build a European social model at EU level, in order to download change in to 
domestic industrial relations, ‘pulled’ the GMB toward Europe.  Ideology, in this 
case, shifted in order for the union to fulfil its role as a power-seeking 
organisation able to respond based on their own assessment of the changing 
external environment. 
The GMB perspective on the development of an EU social model is exactly 
congruent with the TUC.  Both organisations recognise the diversity of models 
within the EU but argue that this is only apparent when comparison is between 
member-states.  If comparisons are made between the contours of Japanese 
and American industrial relations and the various European models then a 
discernable European Social Model is clearly distinguishable; the legitimate role 
of trade unions, strong welfare states and the belief that the state has a role in 
protecting the casualties of globalisation. [Tufe 2002]  
The GMB has developed a very positive policy response to further EU 
integration.  A perspective that is optimistic on the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
EU to construct and maintain a social dimension at EU level.  The overall 
strategy to Europe has been termed ‘going over and under’, referring to 
bypassing the UK government to cooperate with local, regional and European 
tiers of government and organisations.  Since the early 1990s the GMB have 
located an office in Brussels to lobby and act as an early warning mechanism. 
The GMB recognise that the EU is not simply a process resulting in power 
shifting upwards to the EU level but given the principal of subsidiarity, a multi-
level polity is emerging. ‘The EU is a hybrid of the intergovernmental and the 
supranational’ [ibid: 22]. 
Policy was generally formulated within the GMB ‘European steering group’ 
consisting of the General Secretary, European Officer, Director of Research, 
various interested Regional heads and National officers.  The group only made 
recommendations and had no authority to dictate policy.  The intention was to 
draw in and involve union personnel in the European dimension of the 
organisation. 
John was always trying to make it to provide opportunities for his colleagues to 
take a greater interest actually than they were inclined to do. [GMB official]   14
The Brussels Office provides a direct feed into the Commission and the 
European Parliament, the GMB currently has 16 MEPs.  The Brussels Office 
personnel are in constant contact with the General Secretary probably more so 
than with their direct supervisor [Director of Research].  In terms of interest 
representation at the EU level the office has enabled the GMB to establish a 
network of contacts not simply confined to the Commission or the European 
Parliament but with other trade unions, political parties and pressure groups not 
normally encountered on traditional trade union paths to interest representation.   
However, priority was still given to efforts to ensure the position of the TUC was 
in line with that of the GMB.  EU engagement prioritised the political rather than 
the industrial sphere of action.  The TUC was potentially an integral player at EU 
level both within the ETUC and vis-à-vis the Commission.  Edmonds was head of 
the TUC European Steering group and GMB officials regularly attended the 
TUC’s Network Europe Contact Points [NECP] monthly meetings of affiliate 
officials. 
The office helped established a high European profile and this enables the GMB 
to monitor and disseminate information both within the union organisation and to 
their lobby targets.  One way of achieving both aims has been the production of a 
monthly bulletin, the European News Bulletin, this is sent out each month to 
Labour MEPs, Commission officials, other MEPs [outside the EPLP], members of 
the EP Secretariat, the ETUC, the EIFs, sister trade unions across the EU and 
internally to Regional Secretaries/National Officers/Heads of Departments etc.  
The bulletin contains a regular briefing on GMB activities and views on European 
issues and effectively kills two birds with one stone. 
Some GMB officials question the current requirement for an office in Brussels.  
When the office was established the British trade union movement had no full 
time representation in Brussels therefore it was a necessity to locate in Brussels 
in order to track initiatives and ensure the interests of British workers were 
channelled into the EU institutions.  However, the maintenance of the office is 
very expensive [£250 000 a year] and given developments since the early 1990s 
some ask the question if the GMB currently didn’t already have an office in 
Brussels the establishment of one be justified?  The most important factor is 
presenting a coherent and well thought out position to the Commission and other 
lobbying targets and this does not require a presence in Brussels. 
In the beginning of the 1990s the TUC did not have its own office and its own staff 
in Brussels, there was no Channel Tunnel to make travel between London and 
Brussels so easy, you didn’t have John Monks at the ETUC that is very important 
now and you didn’t have the internet you have today or the ability to access all 
sorts of Commission documents via the internet…the context is very different 
today. [GMB Official] 
The GMB have been forced to make a number of cuts to their organisational 
capacity in past 12 months due to a financial crisis.  Interestingly, under new 
leadership, the GMB still take the view that the office is justified.  One of the 
major reasons, outside of the cost, that other trade union organisations have not 
located an office in Brussels is that the perceived benefits are hard to quantify.    15
In addition to informing their membership and raising their profile [local, regional 
& European], can a tangible benefit be discerned from the permanent presence 
in terms of the contents of EU legislation?  One MEP certainly thinks so. 
I am a practical sort of person and perhaps I can best refer to my area of work… 
since 1984 I have concentrated on health & safety and workplace legislation.  
During all of that time, my greatest ally and advisor in moulding the laws passing 
through the Parliament has been Nigel Bryson, GMB’s Director of Health, Safety 
and the Environment.  Some 60% of the amendments, which we have adopted in 
this field, have been incorporated in the finished legislation. That means in reality 
that much of the content of these laws has come from Nigel’s pen or the pen of 
other trade unionist. [Simon Hughes MEP – Address to GMB Congress 1993, 
p.425 – Report of Congress] 
On specifics, such as the institutional set up of the EU, the ‘democratic deficit’ 
and the lack of fundamental workers’ rights the GMB are critical.  In a nutshell the 
current institutional arrangements have not sufficiently delivered positive EU 
integration.  Reform is required for the political economy to shift favourably at the 
EU level. 
Rather than weaken the EU role there should be greater legislative powers for the 
European Parliament, more qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and 
a strong Commission to carry out EU decisions. [Tufe: 14] 
Research to date has indicated strongly that there was no serious internal 
opposition to the European policies or strategies of the GMB.  This could be the 
result of a lack of interest in EU issues by activists or members or even a lack of 
knowledge with the GMB official policy position and strategy. When asked if this 
lack of opposition was in part due to the EU being a remote issue for the 
membership a GMB official stated 
..no actually there was clearly evidence of real interest amongst activists and 
members generally about Europe. I think they accepted the case that the General 
Secretary might be in a position to deliver, the union might be in a position to 
deliver, by lobbying in Brussels and when you consider what the alternative was, at 
least it was practical and pragmatic, the GMB, GMWU at its core …is pragmatic 
and practical 
Internal documents presented and passed by conference are supportive of both 
economic and social integration.  In addition when the Brussels Office was 
originally opened in the early 1990s the funding for this experiment had to be 
passed through the bi-annual Conference. 
In addition, within the executive council [CEC] of the GMB John Edmonds was 
able and willing to lead.  
To be quite honest I think the General Secretary had an easy run on matters 
European, there was never any strong opposition to the union’s formal stance 
Within the CEC the regional rather than the sectoral representatives are 
important, members of the CEC generally vote with their respective regional 
head.  Some regions, notably London, were not of the same EU perspective.   16
Interestingly the London region membership has a larger percentage of public 
sector workers than the GMB average
14. However, the regional heads  
were prepared to let the General Secretary take the lead on matters European 
providing he would leave them more or less alone to run their regions 
The preceding brief overview of the GMB is therefore an example of voluntary 
Europeanisation both in terms of policy position and engagement; this approach 
encountered few internal constraints of note. 
 
Position on EMU  
The GMB view the establishment of a single European currency as a dynamic 
toward deeper integration in other sectors of integration.  The introduction of the 
Euro will bring European macro-economic governance and quicken the pace of 
the construction of a European regime of industrial relations.  EMU is not 
analysed solely on the detail of its provisions and their likely effects but as an 
integral part of driving forward the integration process.  By signing up to EMU 
Britain would then be entrenched in the EU making the prospect of British 
workers enjoying the benefits of a EU social model much more likely. Long term 
considerations seem to have been prioritised over the short term impact of UK 
entry. 
Britain’s role in the EU is an additional factor that has influenced GMB appraisal 
of the pros and cons of UK entry and is not specifically connected to the terms of 
EMU..  Domestic inertia on this crucial EU issue is not a viable long-term position 
for the UK.  If Britain wants to be at the ‘heart’ of Europe it must surely be at the 
table when some of the most important economic decisions are taken affecting 
British citizens?   
But indifference is not an option. We cannot stand back from the issue of the single 
currency. If we fail to prepare for entry we risk a disaster. Can we be an important 
member of the EU and stay outside the Euro? Almost certainly not. The slogan I 
have seen, “Europe yes, the Euro no” is a con. [speech at TUC 2000] 
These two [indirect] political arguments in support of the single currency 
outweigh the actual costs for the GMB.  In economic terms UK entry into EMU 
would bring with it the following benefits for Britain; easier trade and travel, 
protection against currency speculators, increased employment and the 
maintenance of high inward investment from non-EU based countries [Tufe 2002 
& Edmonds 2000]. 
The major fault line for divergent interpretations of EMU regard the likely impact 
of the Stability and Growth Pact [SGP].  Mulhearn [2004: 305] asks the question 
how do the pro-Euro trade unions,  
                                                 
14 The London Region in particular is not supportive of the national leadership on the pro-Euro policy, 
GMB London members are predominantly public sector workers.  An internal poll of 1,252 shop stewards 
[respondents out of 2,952] found that 67% do not want to join the Euro [Guardian March 17
th 2003].   17
reach such a benign conclusion given what we have so far learned , in particular 
about, for example, the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact? 
For Mulhearn the question remains unanswered. According to the GMB [Tufe] 
the SGP being applied in Britain is not to be feared. 
These rules pose no special problem for Britain now that the Labour Government 
has eliminated the structural deficit in our public finances. British public sector 
borrowing is comfortably within the Maastricht criteria. It is simple scaremongering 
to argue that joining the single currency would require public spending cuts. [Tufe 
2002: 11] 
There are some fears expressed here that joining the euro will mean public 
spending cuts. We believe those fears are misplaced. The Chancellor has tough, 
golden rules for public finance, even tougher than those in the Eurozone Stability 
and Growth Pact. Indeed, joining the Eurozone, given their current standards, 
would mean more flexibility for public spending over the economic cycle, not less. 
Britain's public services have nothing to fear from joining the euro and 
manufacturing has everything to gain.  [Steve Pickering (GMB) speaking in support 
of Composite Motion 17, TUC 2002] 
Detailed consideration has not been given to the SGP by the GMB. Documents 
referring to EMU tend to skip over the SGP dismissively and focus in on the long-
term strategic and political benefits of UK entry. This is somewhat surprising 
since there have been dissenting voices from within the GMB concerning the 
SGP from the London Region [Guardian 2003a] and CEC officials representing 
members in the public sector.  However, reiterating the above, dissenting voices 
have been placated. 
The members in public services are familiar with the TUPE regulations, the 
Acquired Rights Directive and so long as they can be reassured that the UK joining 
the single currency would not mean a squeeze on public spending…as long as the 
wording of the stance takes that on board [GMB Official] 
Returning to the Dyson’s discourses on EMU the GMB position reflects the latter 
two and rejects the notions that EMU is a force for globalising neo-liberalism 
and/or the dissolution of national identity/sovereignty.  Economically the GMB 
views EMU using a form of discourse four; the GMB accepts the rationale that a 
single market and EMU are necessities if European firms are going to compete in 
international markets vis-à-vis the USA and Japan.  Industrial restructuring is 
preferential to long-term extinction.  Additionally the GMB uses discourse three, 
EMU as preserving the European model, as a condition attached to its 
acceptance of neo-liberalism.  The development of the social dimension is 
assumed to flow from economic integration.  This is a big leap of faith given the 
present governance structure and political economy at EU level.  In terms of 
Direct and Indirect impacts of EMU, GMB Europeanisation is voluntary even if it 
presently views the governance of EMU as inadequate its policy reflects the 
belief that this will alter in the future.   18
The T&G Overview. 
The T&G represents over 900 000 members and organises in a number of 
sectors, it has a slightly higher percentage of members in the manufacturing 
sector than does the GMB.  The key differences between the T&G and the GMB 
are ideological and organisational.  The relative strength of each region does not 
compare to the ‘baronial status’ of the regional heads in the GMB; the union 
polity is much more sectorally orientated and politicised.  Traditionally the T&G 
has been a more ‘participatory’ model of trade union organisation than the more 
‘representative’ orientation of the GMB.  Democracy and accountability are 
important concepts for the T&G [T&G Official]. 
The major fault lines among the membership are industrial sector and ideology.  
The T&G is much more factionalised [at all levels] and this resulted in a 
particularly bitter period of in fighting and rivalry in the run-up to the recent 
leadership elections.  Interestingly the issue of Europe did not surface in the 
recent elections.  The differences between the GMB candidates Kevin Curran 
and Paul Kenny on the issue were stark; it seems that all of the candidates for 
the T&G leadership were either extremely hostile or indifferent to European 
integration
15. 
In the mid to late 1980s it appeared on the surface that the T&G had indeed 
turned a corner.  Ron Todd’s infamous speech, at the 1988 ‘Delors’ Congress, 
although hardly Euro-idealist did suggest a pragmatic acceptance of the potential 
EU opportunities in the face of the paucity of domestic opportunity.  Todd’s 
speech was however made in his capacity as head of international committee of 
the TUC and not as head of the T&G.  It was also made reluctantly as up until 
then the prevailing view in the T&G was that the EC represented a pro-business 
agenda, it was a capitalist’s club. [Interview] 
Internal T&G documents dated around the time of the 1992 programme highlight 
the pessimistic view that officials held vis-à-vis the development of the EU.  The 
analysis at this time focuses almost exclusively on the industrial implications of 
the 1992 process and the subsequent Maastricht Treaty.  The political 
possibilities were not as systematically presented except for the possibility of the 
European Works Council Directive.  The T&G preferred to pursue traditional 
industrial policies based in horizontal linkages but were not prepared to shift 
power upwards to their EIFs.  Indeed the T&G were already concerned at the 
coordinating role the EIFs were to obtain in the area of European Works Councils 
[EWC] [T&G 1989, 1990, 1995]. 
The T&G did however agree that the economic benefits of market integration as 
espoused by the Commission were real and tangible for workers across Europe.  
European industrial restructuring in some form was a competitive necessity for 
Europe.  In principle the search for European solutions to problems no longer 
                                                 
15 In a recent Guardian Article the new General Secretaries of the T&G and AMICUS both came out 
against the proposed European Constitutional Treaty. [Guardian June 30
th 2004].   19
manageable in the domestic context is the correct one.  For the T&G the devil is 
in the detail. 
The T&G position is more critical than the GMB.  The focuses for criticism are the 
specifics of the integration project rather than the concept of it.  In many ways 
criticisms mirror those of the GMB although they are much more forcefully put 
and do not dissolve away by stepping back and looking at the wider picture. 
The institutional development of the EU and the lack of real democratic 
accountability in the EU contrasts with the T&G culture of ‘transparency, 
openness and accountability’ in union organisation [Morris interview].  These 
developments have left the people behind; Europe has become a Europe of 
institutions, both industrial [trans-national companies] and bureaucratic [formal 
institutions of EU], with little or no democratic accountability or transparency. 
Therefore the emphasis of T&G positions has been EU reform before deeper 
integration rather than deeper integration to drive reform.  A policy position in line 
with the definition of coercive Europeanisation rather than ideological opposition. 
The T&G view this line as ‘constructive engagement’ aimed at reform. On the 
surface however the criticisms appear much the same as the GMB. 
Parliament [EU] should have the responsibility of controlling the Executive, the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission itself, we are also arguing for greater 
accountability to the peoples of Europe and so build a different type of Europe than 
the one we have at the moment…Conceptually we are not anti this and anti that, 
we see Europe as a very very very important [T&G Official]. 
In terms of the labour market Directives that have resulted from the incorporation 
of the social chapter into the Treaty proper, the T&G have been very supportive.  
This is hardly surprising given the lack of rights stemming from Westminster and 
Whitehall.  Even those in the National Executive Council [NEC] vehemently 
ideologically opposed to European integration found it difficult to argue against 
EU-level workers rights [T&G Official].  From another perspective this support for 
the EU social dimension is surprising.  At the domestic level the T&G have not 
been supportive of the TUC in their promotion of the ‘social partnership’ theme 
but have supported the organising approach.  The information and Consultation 
Directive, for instance, brings the social partnership model into British industrial 
relations.  The dual channel model of worker voice and the potential threat to the 
traditional model of oppositional bargaining represents a clear misfit in 
institutional and ideological terms.  The T&G viewed these mechanisms for 
worker voice as only likely to dominate traditional British norms of industrial 
relations in workplaces where trade unions were not influential.  In workplaces 
where bargaining already takes place the arrangements are not likely to collapse 
simply because a consultative forum is opened up to union members and non-
members alike.  Only where trade unions were weak are these consultative 
forums likely to be the main channel for worker voice. In the view of the T&G 
consultative forums potentially provides leverage for union organisations in 
unorganised companies rather than a threat to collective bargaining 
arrangements in organised firms.   20
Although the T&G were the first to appoint a dedicated Euro-coordinator, it was a 
position based in London.  The official would travel to Brussels periodically but 
was not a permanent fixture there.  The official eventually was ‘let go’ by the T&G 
in the late 1990s and the post was never replaced.  In addition the T&G fail to 
send a representative to NECP meetings at the TUC although they do receive 
the papers.  The T&G rely very heavily on the TUC office in Brussels for 
information gathering and can tap into the information at Congress House. 
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, via national government 
officials, are the preferred targets of interest representation.  Contact with the 
MEPs is variable rather than constant and is no where nearly as developed as 
GMB networks.  The T&G do not lobby the Commission directly and therefore 
miss the opportunity to represent their interests in the initial formulation of 
initiatives.  One of the stated aims of the GMB approach was to go over UK 
government objections and filter their interests into the EU before the EU 
parliament or Council amend and adopt
16.  The T&G views transposition as the 
key stage to influence because at the EU level Directives generally only set out 
the broad concepts and framework of the initiative, domestic governments 
translate them into law.  For the GMB the more you could get included at the EU 
level the less scope for a minimal transposition.  Given the opposition of the 
domestic UK government [and employers associations], minimal transposition is 
very likely; lobbying the Commission is therefore a pre-emptive strike.  The T&G 
view this process slightly differently.  They are happy with ‘framework’ Directives 
rather than something more prescriptive at the EU level.  By enabling domestic 
actors at domestic level to hammer out the detail, the initiative in question is 
more likely to fit into domestic ways of doing things. 
Responsibility for the political aggregation and representation of T&G interests is 
vested in the office of the General Secretary although the leeway apparent in the 
exercise of this responsibility is subject to a much higher degree of internal 
constraints than was the case in the GMB.  The institutional set up is very similar, 
sector and regions, but in practice the Executive Council was more politicised 
and unwilling simply to allow the leadership of the union to lead.  Political factions 
compound the prominent sectoral composition.  This is particularly noticeable 
when analysing EMU position of the T&G. 
 
Position on EMU. 
The general economic benefits of EMU are accepted by the T&G especially for 
the manufacturing sector.  The clear division with GMB interpretations again is in 
the detail rather than the concept of integration.  The conference motion passed 
by the T&G demonstrates the diversity of perspectives that have left their mark 
on policy.  In this particular sphere of integration the T&G is again advocating 
reform of EU institutions to a large extent with the intent of uploading a domestic 
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the TUC and Labour Party.   21
model of economic management.  The economic arguments for the single 
currency are, for the T&G, the starting point for the debate not the conclusion of 
the discussion.  The benefits, for trade unions, are only attainable if the 
framework for EMU is conducive to their objectives. 
The European Central Bank [ECB] and the SGP require radical reform as a 
prerequisite for UK entry.  The ability of national governments to control their 
own economies will be limited by the SGP and there is no subsequent shift in 
political control to EU level.  Bill Morris often presented the T&G position in terms 
of timing, a ‘yes but not yet’ message [T&G 2001, 2003a b c]. However, when 
asked directly if the T&G would support entry if the Chancellor announced that 
the 5 economic tests were met he replied 
But where is the transparency or reform of the ECB...Does this mean that you 
[Gordon Brown] will abandon the investment in public services? What about the 
constraints monetary union places upon you, if you measure the government’s 
policy of public investment against the Maastricht criteria, it doesn’t add up. 
Taking the ECB first the lack of direct democratic control is of deep concern to 
the T&G, an example of the ‘democratic deficit’ endemic in EU governance 
presently.  Given the absence of central democratic control the rules governing 
what the ECB can do are crucial.  The T&G point out that the rules allow the ECB 
to act when inflation is above target [price stability] but do not allow the ECB to 
intervene if the economy experiences low growth and under target inflation.  The 
deflationary bias of the ECB is compounded by the necessity of a ‘one fits all’ 
interest rate.  A potential for a recessionary disaster with no political or 
democratic intervention possible. 
So the European Union will lack both the resources and the power to conduct an 
interventionist economic policy…..We have argued that by introducing greater 
democracy into the working of the EU, and establishing political supervision of a 
European Central Bank, these issues could be addressed. [Morris1998] 
The SGP quite simply would mean that the current levels of public spending in 
the UK are unsustainable. 
inflexible criteria and strict budget limits of the Euro’s Stability & Growth Pact is 
putting public expenditure and government commitments to improved services in 
these Eurozone countries the severest pressure  [T&G Composite 24, July 2003] 
The EU should adopt the British model of economic policy making and macro-
economic management developed by the present Chancellor.  The ‘golden rule’ 
of balancing budgets over the economic cycle is preferred especially as this 
would provide increased flexibility in a Europe with a single ‘one fits all’ exchange 
rate.  The operation of the Bank of England provides a better example of how a 
central back should operate according to T&G representation to Treasury Select 
Committee [Mulhearn 2004].  The Treasury, a government department with a 
democratically elected head, determines the policy that the Bank has to operate.  
Policy can alter in response to economic conditions and the execution of policy is 
transparent as the minutes of meetings are published.     22
Referring to Dyson’s types of discourse the T&G position needs to be divided into 
two; EMU as it is now and EMU as it could be.  The T&G does accept the 
economic arguments for EMU and can envisage UK entry but only once the 
political issues have been remedied.  The removal of national autonomy is not 
viewed as discourse 2, in terms of national sovereignty being diminished.  The 
fear is not for national sovereignty but that the ability to manage macro 
economics is removed from democratic accountability.  Therefore, given the 
terms of the SGP and the limited remit and accountability of the ECB, EMU is an 
agent of globalising neo-liberalism [discourse 4].  A coercive Europeanisation 
response to both Direct and Indirect impacts of EMU. 
 
Conclusions. 
In terms of Europeanisation the case studies are both diverse and similar.  In 
both organisations the importance of the EU is recognised and accepted.  The 
thesis put forward by Strange [2002: 332] that there ‘has been a marked further 
‘Europeanisation’ of British trade unionism’ is confirmed.  However, this does not 
translate into support for further EU integration.  The changing political economy 
environment has led to the abandonment of naive national Keynesian economic 
policy preferences.  It is in the response to the specifics of EU initiatives and the 
modes of interest representation that a distinction can be made between 
voluntary and engaging [GMB] and coercive and aloof Europeanisation [T&G]. 
The GMB has been active both domestically and in the EU in promoting the 
social dimension to Europe.  It has made use of multiple channels of interest 
representation by building networks at the EU level.  This has led the 
organisation on to paths outside formal trade union structure.  Lobbying a handful 
of MEPs aside, the T&G has not ventured out much.  It relies heavily on the TUC 
for EU information and interest representation [political] and its responses are 
reactive rather than proactive.  Ignoring the Commission and concentrating more 
on transposition rather than the formulation of labour market Directives ‘misses a 
trick’. 
The internal constraints of both organisations vary massively.  Public sector 
workers in both organisations are more wary of EMU making a simple sector 
assessment of perceived economic interest difficult.  The GMB policy making 
process is peculiarly void of the real checks and balances faced by the T&G.  
Sector and ideology rather than perceived economic interest are of over-riding 
importance for the T&G and its governance structure facilitates a more 
participatory model of union democracy.  This has been explicitly recognised in 
their conference policy position. 
This Conference, mindful of the variety of opinions held by T&G members, and 
conscious of the differing effects British entry into the Euro-zone could have on 
different sectors of the economy and the union’s membership, believes that the 
T&G policy on this issue must be rational and open-minded.  [T&G Composite 24, 
July 2003]   23
The desirability of further integration is accepted as a necessity for realising 
traditional trade union objectives.  However, assessments of perceived EU 
opportunities are fundamentally divergent based the specifics, of the current 
governance structure and political economy and how they are likely to develop.  
Divergent positions on European integration are explained by the level of internal 
constraints both in terms of ideology and inherited institutions.   24
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Figure 1. Internal and external conditions of European interest organisations 
[source Dølvik 1997: 22 & Marks & McAdam 1996: 104]] 
 
        Internal Constraints 
        [ l o g i c   o f   m e m b e r s h i p ]  
High    Low 
 
 
Perceived EU opportunities       High 
[logic of influence] 
    
      L o w  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Different Types of Europeanisation [source Bache & Jordan 2004 
adapted for this paper – bold script added] 
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